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THE RESILIENCE OF MÉTIS TITLE: REJECTING ASSUMPTIONS
OF EXTINGUISHMENT FOR MÉTIS LAND RIGHTS
Adam Gaudry* and Karen Drake**
Note: This is the post-print version of a chapter that will appear in Yvonne Boyer &
Larry Chartrand, eds, Métis Rising, vol 1 (Regina: University of Regina Press,
forthcoming in 2020). Please cite to the version published in Métis Rising.

1. Introduction
The Crown long has disputed Métis title claims by contending that any previously
existing Métis rights, including title, have been extinguished.1 We argue, however, that
Métis rights, including title, remain unextinguished in at least some areas of the Métis
homeland.2 In this chapter, we review the three means by which Aboriginal rights can be
extinguished in Canadian law: by surrender, by legislation prior to April 17, 1982, and by
constitutional amendment.3 When applied to the Métis homeland, we conclude that these
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Native Studies and Department of Political Science, University
of Alberta.
** Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University. We wish to thank the
anonymous reviewers, Larry Chartrand, and Jason Madden for their thoughtful comments. Any
errors are our responsibility alone.
1
See e.g. Catherine Bell, “Métis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)” (1997-199836) Alta L
Rev 180 at 181 (explaining that “twentieth-century federal policy…has maintained that whatever
rights [Métis] may have had were effectively terminated through the scrip distribution system”).
2
The Métis Nation’s homeland encompasses much of the three prairie provinces, west into
northern British Columbia, east into parts of Ontario, north into the Northwest Territories, and
south into Montana and North Dakota.
3
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2016)
(loose-leaf 2016 supplement) vol 2 at 28-34.1. Kent McNeil discusses an additional possible
means of extinguishing Aboriginal title which is exhibited in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v
Canada (Attorney General), 101 OTC 1; 40 RPR (3d) 49 (ONSC), aff’d 51 OR (3d) 641, 195
DLR (4th) 135 (ONCA); this is a kind of implicit extinguishment by executive acts: Kent
McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L Rev 301 at 327-44 [McNeil, “Extinguishment”]. Because
of the legal errors within the reasoning employed in support of this means of extinguishment,
McNeil refers to it as “extinguishment by judicial pronouncement”: ibid at 344. McNeil’s critique
is sufficient to dispose of this potential means of extinguishment: ibid. Joseph Magnet considers
and rejects conquest as an additional possible means of extinguishing Aboriginal rights: Joseph
Magnet, Métis Land Rights in Canada (Report submitted to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, 1993) at 74, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2435201>. As Kent McNeil explains, American
law may have allowed for extinguishment by conquest, but this “is not the law of the Crown’s
dominions”: Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at
246. See also Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727 at
767. Contra Mitchell v Canada (Minister of National Revenue - MNR), 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1
SCR 911 (listing three means of extinguishing Aboriginal rights: cession (surrender), legislation,
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means have not effectively extinguished all Métis rights and title. This chapter builds on
our previous work,4 in which we argue that historical Métis land use patterns can satisfy
the test for Aboriginal title as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in
Nation v. British Columbia.5 Once the Métis have shown that their occupation of their
traditional homeland was sufficient, continuous, and exclusive, the next step is to
demonstrate that their title to land has not been extinguished. This chapter takes this next
step, and thus further strengthens the argument in support of Métis title.
In making this argument, we first examine the various jurisprudential arguments
for the extinguishment of Indigenous title. Then, we demonstrate how Métis can argue
against extinguishment through a variety of means including surrender by historic or
contemporary agreement. This chapter has a particular focus on Manitoba, which has a
substantive history of Métis occupation and assertions of title, while there are many other
examples that would meet this test, we will analyze the Manitoba context as evidence of
the strength of these claims.
In undertaking our analysis within this chapter, we do not endorse the
jurisprudence pertaining to, or the existence of, the doctrine of extinguishment. This
jurisprudence and this doctrine have been thoroughly and deftly critiqued elsewhere.6 Our
goal is to supplement this critique by highlighting the historical and legal reasons for
questioning the applicability of this doctrine to Métis title claims.
2. Three Means of Extinguishment
2.1 Extinguishment by Legislation
In Canadian law, Aboriginal rights, including title, could be extinguished
unilaterally by competent legislation prior to April 17, 1982, when section 35(1) of the
and conquest: at para 9) [Mitchell cited to SCC]. This list, however, is obiter, and neither of the
authorities provided in support of it (Royal Proclamation, 1763, RSC 1985, App II, No 1; R v
Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1103) stand for the proposition that conquest could extinguish
Aboriginal rights.
4
Karen Drake & Adam Gaudry. “'The lands...belonged to them, once by the Indian title, twice for
having defended them...and thrice for having built and lived on them': The Law and Politics of
Métis Title” (2016) 54:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
5
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
6
See Paul Joffe & Mary Ellen Turpel, Extinguishment of the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples:
Problems and Alternatives, A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995) at i-ii, online:
<publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.829901/publication.html> (critiquing the doctrine of
extinguishment on numerous grounds, including the apparent double-standard given the absence
of a doctrine of extinguishment of non-Aboriginal rights within Canadian law and the fact that
Aboriginal rights understood as human rights “are the only human rights in Canada that are
subjected to extinguishment”; the lack of capacity of non-Aboriginal governments to extinguish
Aboriginal rights given the contending sovereignties within Canada, which includes the
sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples; and the Crown’s fiduciary duty owed to Aboriginal peoples,
which constrains the Crown’s capacity to extinguish Aboriginal rights).
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Constitution Act, 1982,7 came into effect. After the enactment of section 35(1), legislation
can no longer extinguish Aboriginal rights and title.8 Thus, after April 17, 1982,
Aboriginal rights can be extinguished only by surrender or by constitutional amendment,9
both of which are discussed below in the remaining sections of this chapter. This section
examines whether Métis rights have been extinguished by legislation.
The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow established the current test for the
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights by legislation: legislation must exhibit a clear and
plain intention to extinguish the right at issue.10 The onus of meeting this test is on the
party claiming the right has been extinguished.11 In articulating this test, the Court
affirmed the standard for extinguishment expressed by Hall J in Calder v. AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia12 and rejected the standard expressed by Judson J in Calder,
which was that legislation that is merely inconsistent with the continued existence of an
Aboriginal right is sufficient to extinguish that right.13 Elsewhere in his decision in
Calder, Hall J explained that because Aboriginal rights are legal rights, they can only be
extinguished by surrender or by competent legislation, and that the legislation must be
specific.14 This is a high threshold.15 Courts have rarely concluded that legislation met the
‘clear and plain intention’ test and thus was effective in extinguishing Aboriginal rights
or title.16
For the purpose of effecting an extinguishment, competent legislation means
either federal or Imperial legislation.17 With respect to federal legislation, a majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada established in Delgamuukw that the federal government has
“the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title”18 pursuant
to section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides that the federal
7

Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
(“The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed.”) [Constitution Act, 1982].
8
R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow cited to SCR]; Mitchell, supra
note 3 at para 11; R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 39, [2005] 2 SCR 220.
9
Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) (loose-leaf 2015 supplement), vol 1, ch
5 at para 750.
10
Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1099; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para
180, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
11
Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1099.
12
Sparrow, supra note 8 at 1098-99, affirming Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia,
[1973] SCR 313 at 404, 34 DLR (3d) 145 p, Hall J, dissenting [Calder].
13
Sparrow, supra note 8 at para 37, rejecting Calder, supra note 12 at 333, Judson J.
14
Calder, ibid at 402, Hall J. For an explanation why only legislation, and not executive acts,
could extinguish Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Extinguishment”, supra note 3 at 311-16.
15
See Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 180.
16
For an instance of a successful extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, see R v Horseman, [1990]
1 SCR 901 at para 72, 73 Alta LR (2d) 193 [Horseman]. For a discussion of this case, see text
accompanying note 109, below.
17
For a discussion of the Imperial Parliament’s authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights, see
McNeil, “Extinguishment”, supra note 3 at 317-18, 322.
18
Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at paras 173-74.
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government has legislative jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians”.19 This principle applies equally to Métis title, given the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
according to which Métis are “Indians” for the purposes of section 91(24) and thus within
the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government.20 With respect to Imperial
legislation, a majority of the Court held in R v Sappier; R v Gray that “during the colonial
period, the power to extinguish aboriginal rights rested with the Imperial Crown.”21
The evisceration of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity as applied to
Aboriginal rights in Tsilhqot’in Nation does not alter the requirement that legislation be
federal in order to extinguish Aboriginal rights. While it is true that Tsilhqot’in Nation
stands for the proposition that Aboriginal rights, including title, are no longer within the
core of the federal government’s jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(24),22 this proposition
pertains to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, which provided only one of two
independent rationales for the federal legislation requirement in Delgamuukw.23 The
other rationale rests on a pith and substance analysis, which is unaffected by Tsilhqot’in
Nation’s removal of Aboriginal rights from the core of section 91(24). The majority in
Delgamuukw explained that although provincial laws of general application can apply to
s. 91(24) Indians and Indian land proprio vigore (of their own force), a provincial law of
general application could not apply proprio vigore so as to extinguish Aboriginal rights.24
In order to meet the test for extinguishment discussed above, the provincial law, of
necessity, would not be a law of general application. That is, any provincial law that
meets the high threshold of Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test would thereby be in
relation to Indians and Indian lands under s. 91(24) and thus would be ultra vires.25 In
other words, the pith and substance of the provincial legislation would be in relation to s.
91(24), even though the provincial legislation would not touch upon the core of s. 91(24)
after Tsilhqot’in Nation.
As a result, when assessing the possible extinguishment of Métis rights, absent a
delegation of authority by the Imperial parliament,26 provincial and colonial legislation
can be excluded from the analysis. From the Métis perspective, this is one of the victories

19

Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic, c 3, (UK), s 91(24).
Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at para 57, [2016]
1 SCR 99 [Daniels].
21
R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at para 58, [2006] 2 SCR 686 [Sappier & Gray], citing
Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 15. McNeil explains that the Imperial Parliament’s authority
to extinguish Aboriginal rights would have continued after Confederation; presumably it could
have extinguished Aboriginal rights by constitutional amendment until it enacted the Canada Act
1982: McNeil, “Extinguishment”, supra note 3 at 322.
22
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 5 at paras 140, 151.
23
Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 181.
24
Delgamuukw, ibid at para 179-80.
25
Delgamuukw, ibid at para 180.
26
For a discussion of the significance of Imperial authority delegated to colonial bodies, see
McNeil, “Extinguishment”, supra note 3 at 318-22.
20
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of Daniels overlooked by those who questioned the value of a mere declaration that the
Métis are “Indians” under s. 91(24).27
An exhaustive examination of all federal and Imperial legislation from the late
eighteenth century to 1982 is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the only
potentially relevant statutes of which we are aware are the Manitoba Act, 187028 and the
Dominion Lands Act.29 The former sets out a process by which the Indian title of the
Métis located within the original postage stamp province of Manitoba would be
extinguished, and the latter does the same for the Métis located within the north-west but
outside of the postage stamp province. Section 31 of the Manitoba Act states:
And whereas, it is expedient, towards the extinguishment of the
Indian Title to the lands in the Province, to appropriate a portion
of such ungranted lands, to the extent of one million four hundred
thousand acres thereof, for the benefit of the families of the halfbreed, residents, it is hereby enacted, that, under regulations to be
from time to time made by the Governor General in Council, the
Lieutenant-Governor shall select such lots or tracts in such parts
of the Province as he may deem expedient, to the extent aforesaid,
and divide the same among the children of the half-breed heads of
families residing in the Province at the time of the said transfer to
Canada, and the same shall be granted to the said children
respectively, in such mode and on such conditions as to
settlement and otherwise, as the Governor General in Council
may from time to time determine.30
Section 125(e) of the Dominion Lands Act, as amended in 1879, states:
The following powers are hereby delegated to the
Governor in Council:
…
To satisfy any claims existing in connection with the
extinguishment of the Indian title preferred by half-breeds
27

See HW Roger Townshend, “What Difference did Daniels Make?” (paper prepared for the
Ontario Bar Association’s 15th Annual Charter Conference, 6 October 2016) [unpublished,
archived with the author].
28
Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vic, c 3 (Canada) [Manitoba Act].
29
Dominion Lands Act, 1872, 35 Vic, c 23 [Dominion Lands Act]. See Joffe & Turpel, supra note
6 (arguing that “until 1977, it would appear that the only Canadian legislative provisions
expressly contemplating (though not actually legislating) ‘extinguishment’ of ‘Indian title’ were
found in the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the Dominion Lands Act in regard to the Métis” at 93-94
[footnotes omitted]). For a discussion of the significance of limitation statutes with respect to
Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Extinguishment”, supra note 3 at 325-27.
30
Manitoba Act, supra note 28, s 31. Nineteenth century legislation typically used the term “halfbreed” in the English version of official documents and “Métis” in the French versions. We use
the terminology referred to in the legislation when doing analysis, we use the term “Métis” which
is the preferred name among Métis.
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resident in the North-West Territories outside the limits of
Manitoba, on the fifteenth day of July, one thousand eight
hundred and seventy, by granting lands to such persons, to such
extent and on such terms and conditions, as may be expedient.31
Given the constitutional status of the Manitoba Act,32 s. 31 prima facie falls within the
category of constitutional amendments, which are considered at section 2.3, below. The
test for extinguishment by means of legislation and for extinguishment by means of
constitutional amendment, though, is one and the same.33
At first glance, both provisions might appear to satisfy Sparrow’s clear and plain
intention test; they explicitly state that their purpose is to extinguish the Indian title of the
Métis. These explicit statements might seem not only to meet but to exceed the threshold
for extinguishment, according to which the legislature’s intention must be clear and plain,
but need not be express.34 As Joffe and Turpel rightly recognize, though, these provisions
contemplate, but do not actually legislate, an extinguishment of Métis title.35 In other
words, the intention exhibited within these provisions is not to extinguish Métis title
directly, but rather to allow for an extinguishment upon the occurrence of certain, future,
events. More specifically, s. 31 of the Manitoba Act outlines a process for distributing 1.4
million acres of land to the children of Métis heads of families, the purpose of which is to
extinguish Métis title. Similarly, s. 12(e) of the Dominion Lands Act gives the Governor
in Council the power to extinguish Métis title by granting land.36 The office of the
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs seems to have recognized the accuracy of this
interpretation when it issued a report in 1906 stating that the Aboriginal title of the
“Indians and half-breeds” in a certain portion of Saskatchewan and Alberta had not yet
been extinguished; the report recommended making a treaty with the Indians and settling
the claims of the half-breeds.37 If s. 12(e) by itself had extinguished the Aboriginal rights
of the Métis, then the 1906 report would have been redundant and therefore unnecessary
with respect to the Métis. Thus, s. 31 and s. 12(e), in and of themselves, do not satisfy the
clear and plain intention test as they only allude to another means for future
extinguishment. The analysis, then, requires an examination of the events and actions
undertaken to implement these provisions. The issuance of scrip was a method of
31

Dominion Lands Act, supra note 29, s 12(e).
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 7, Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982.
33
Horseman, supra note 16, provides an instance of an extinguishment by means of constitutional
amendment. Horseman was decided before Sparrow, and so the court in Horseman does not refer
to Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test. That being said, the majority in Gladstone, which was
decided subsequent to Sparrow, explains that the reason an extinguishment was found in
Horseman was because the constitutional document in question—the Natural Resources Transfer
Agreement—evinced “the necessary clear and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal rights to
hunt commercially”: R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 38, 137 DLR (4th) 648
[Gladstone].
34
Gladstone, ibid at para 34; Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 180.
35
Joffe & Turpel, supra note 6 at 93-94, 107. See also Magnet, supra note 3 at 73.
36
Dominion Lands Act, 1872, 35 Vic, c 23. 12(e).
37
See R v Morin and Daigneault, [1996] 3 CNLR 157, [1996] SJ No 262 at 11, citing Order-inCouncil 1459 [Morin & Daigneault].
32
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implementing both s. 31 and s. 12(e).38 Scrip referred to a certificate that entitled the
holder “to receive payment later in the form of cash, goods or land.”39
Sections 31 and 12(e), as well as the issuance of scrip pursuant to these
provisions, has been the subject of various instances of litigation, none of which is
determinative of the issue of the extinguishment of Métis title. In Manitoba Métis
Federation Inc v. Canada (Attorney General), the trial judge concluded, and the Court of
Appeal agreed, that the purpose of s. 31 was not to extinguish the Indian title of the
Métis.40 At first glance, this appears to be a victory for the Métis. This conclusion,
however, was the position advanced by the Crown in attempting to counter the Métis
claimants’ argument that the language of s. 31 constituted an admission that the Métis of
the Red River in 1870 held Indian title. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected
the position of the Métis claimants and held that the language of extinguishment in s. 31
was used as a matter of political expediency, “to make palatable to the Opposition the
grant of land and thereby ensure passage of the Act.”41 At the same time, the Court of
Appeal made the incongruous statement that the ability of the Métis of the Red River “to
claim Aboriginal title was lost (or at least seriously impeded) through” the enactment of
s. 31.42 This statement is not determinative of the significance of s. 31, as it is not based
on an application of Sparrow’s clear and plain intention test to s. 31. In fact, no level of
court in Manitoba Metis Federation applied the clear and plain intention test to s. 31. It
was not necessary to do so because the claim advanced in Manitoba Metis Federation
was for breach of fiduciary duty, not for Aboriginal title.43
In R. v. Morin and Daigneault, a judge of the Saskatchewan Provincial Court held
that the scrip issued to the Métis for the sake of implementing a later version of s. 12(e)
of the Dominion Lands Act was not effective in extinguishing the Métis claimants’
Aboriginal right to fish.44 The Dominion Lands Act makes no mention of fishing rights
and thus did not meet the clear and plain intention test for extinguishing fishing rights.45
The question whether scrip extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis claimants,
however, was not before the Court.46 This question is at issue in Morin v. Canada.47
38

Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 37, [2013]
1 SCR 623 (explaining that scrip was issued to those inadvertently left out of the allotment of
land made pursuant to s. 31) [Manitoba Metis Federation].
39
Jean Teillet, Métis Law in Canada (Pape Salter Teillet, 2016) (loose-leaf, 2016 supplement) at
3-11.
40
Manitoba Métis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 MBCA 71 at paras 188,
238, 242, 255 Man R (2d) 167 [Manitoba Métis Federation CA].
41
Manitoba Métis Federation CA, ibid at para 188, 242.
42
Manitoba Métis Federation CA, ibid at para 505.
43
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded—in the course of holding that the Métis
had not established the communal interest in land necessary to ground a fiduciary duty—that the
Métis plaintiffs failed to establish that the Métis held Aboriginal title to their lands: Manitoba
Metis Federation, supra note 38 at para 59. For a critique of the majority’s reasoning on this
point and a defence of the argument in support of Métis title, see Drake & Gaudry, supra note 4.
44
Morin & Daigneault, supra note 37 at 12.
45
Morin & Daigneault, ibid at 11-12.
46
Morin & Daigneault, ibid at 11.
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According to Jean Teillet, to date, this is the only claim seeking a declaration that the
Métis have Aboriginal title.48 Teillet reports, however, that the proceedings in this case
are currently stayed.49
We argue below that the nature of the events and actions surrounding s. 31 and s.
12(e) is such that the analysis which best upholds the honour of the Crown and facilitates
reconciliation is one viewed through the lens of a potential surrender, rather than
extinguishment by legislation or constitutional amendment. For this reason, we examine
s. 31 and s. 12(e) below within the section on extinguishment by surrender.
2.2 Extinguishment by Surrender
Just as the federal government has jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights, so
too does it have jurisdiction to accept a surrender of Aboriginal rights,50 which
undoubtedly includes Métis rights after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Daniels. Thus, any supposed surrender made solely to a provincial government can be
excluded from the analysis.
2.2.1 Historical Treaties
History provides little evidence of extinguishment of Métis rights through
surrender by treaty. Although individuals of mixed ancestry were occasionally admitted
into treaty, generally Métis collectives in Canada did not execute historical land surrender
treaties, with only one possible exception, discussed below. Those Métis who entered
into a treaty on an individual basis did not thereby extinguish their descendants’
Aboriginal rights.51 As the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Powley explains,
extinguishment depends, at least in part, on whether the Métis community collectively
adhered to a treaty.52 The federal government attempted to avoid treaty-making with
Métis collectives whenever possible, preferring instead to deal with the Métis as
individuals by issuing scrip to them pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act, discussed below
at section 2.2.4. The one exception just mentioned is the 1875 Half-breed adhesion to
Treaty 3 signed by the “Half-breeds” at Rainy River and Rainy Lake in northwestern
Ontario.53 The claim that those the Crown refered to as “Half-breeds” who executed the

47

Morin v Canada & Saskatchewan (Q.B. File No. 619-1994). See Teillet, supra note 39 at 1190.
48
Teillet, supra note 39 at 11-90.
49
Teillet, ibid at 11-90.
50
Delgamuukw, supra note 10 at para 175.
51
R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at para 35, [2003] 2 SCR 207 [Powley].
52
Powley, ibid.
53
The “Half-breeds” in the Rainy River and Rainy Lake area in Ontario signed an adhesion to
Treaty 3 on September 12, 1875: Treaty 3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux
Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians at the Northwest Angle on the Lake of the Woods with
Adhesions, Cat No Ci 72-0366, online: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada
<www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028675/1100100028679>.
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adhesion constituted a “Métis” community is contested.54 If the community at issue is a
Métis community, the question arises whether the adhesion to Treaty 3 extinguished the
rights and title of that Métis community.
The federal and provincial governments take the position that the numbered
treaties, given their written text, effected an extinguishment by surrender of Aboriginal
rights, including title, and replaced those rights with the hunting, fishing and other rights
set out in the treaties.55 Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada thus far have been
consistent with this interpretation,56 including with respect to Treaty 3.57 Indigenous
peoples, in contrast, have long disputed the Crown’s interpretation.58 Both the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
explain that Indigenous peoples understood and still understand treaties as agreements to
share the land on a nation-to-nation basis, and not as “extinguishments” or “surrenders”
of “rights”.59 This interpretation is based on oral agreements and Indigenous legal
institutions such as the exchange of wampum belts,60 and is supported not only by

54

On the one hand, Victor Lytwyn characterizes those who executed the adhesion to Treaty 3 as
being “Métis”: Victor P Lytwyn, “In the Shadows of the Honorable Company: Nicolas Chatelain
and the Métis of Fort Frances” in Nicole St-Onge, Brenda Macdougall & Carolyn Podruchny,
Contours of a People: Metis Family, Mobility, and History (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2012) 194 at 194, 219-220. On the other hand, Sara Mainville, who is a descendant of
Nicholas Chatelaine (who signed the adhesion to Treaty 3 on behalf of the “Half-breeds”),
characterizes Chatelaine as being “a French/Anishinaabe ‘half-breed’” and not as being “Métis”:
Sara J Mainville, “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation under Section 35” (2007) 6
Indigenous LJ 141 at 142.
55
For example, the written text of Treaty 3 states, in part: “[the Indigenous signatories] do hereby
cede, release, surrender and yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada for Her
Majesty the Queen and Her successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to
the lands included within the [the limits specified in the treaty]”: ibid.
56
See Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69,
[2005] 3 SCR 388.
57
See Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 SCR
447.
58
See e.g. Sharon Venne, “Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective” in Michael Asch,
ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 173; John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal
Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal
and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1997) 155; Alan Pratt, “The Numbered Treaties and Extinguishment: A Legal
Analysis, A Discussion Paper for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples” (1996), online:
<http://www.prattlaw.ca/articles/TreatiesandExtinguishmentSeptember1996.pdf>.
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Indigenous traditions, but also by the research of non-Indigenous scholars.61 Regardless
of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions applying the Crown’s interpretation, this
issue is far from settled.62 It engages the question whether land is a part of our
community with which we are in a relationship and to which we owe responsibilities, or a
form of property over which we exercise rights. In other words, this issue goes to the
heart of the difference between Indigenous constitutional and legal orders, on the one
hand, and western constitutional and legal orders, on the other.63 This is the very issue
that must be addressed if reconciliation is to be possible. Not surprisingly, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, in its final report, devoted considerable attention to
Indigenous understandings of the treaties, and also called on the federal government, on
behalf of all Canadians, to renew or establish treaty relationships in accordance with the
principles of mutual recognition and mutual respect.64 Thus, dismissing an Indigenous
understanding of the numbered treaties is not an option for those who value
reconciliation.
2.2.2 Modern Agreements
In many instances, Canada has acted as if Métis title has been adequately
extinguished which would make any modern agreements with Métis, for the purposes of
extinguishment of title, unnecessary.65 But in comprehensive land claims processes in the
territorial north, the federal government has seemed to presume that some Métis title
claims are outstanding. While the apparent method of extinguishment through scrip was
practiced in both the north and south, when the comprehensive land claims processes
were initiated in the Northwest Territories, so too were land claims with Métis, both
inside and outside of Dene claims negotiations. As Larry Chartrand notes, both the Sahtu
Dene and Métis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement and the Northwest Territory
Métis Nation Agreement-in-Principle presume that scrip did not sufficiently extinguish
Métis title so as to leave it an ongoing burden on the Crown. Yet, the historical factors by
which Métis title was supposedly extinguished through scrip in the Northwest Territories
are not markedly different from the historical factors of those places in the south where
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Métis title is presumed by the federal government to have been effectively extinguished
by the same scrip policy via the Dominion Lands Act.66
In each of these situations Métis were issued scrip, while also currently rejecting
the claim that scrip was sufficient for the extinguishment of their title. In essence,
Chartrand argues that “the experience in the Northwest Territories demonstrates that the
federal government is prepared to include Metis communities as eligible for the
comprehensive claims process.”67 However, it has not extended the same treatment to
Métis communities south of the 60th parallel, even though the historical federal policy
applied to the Métis there was the same. Chartrand argues that the main reason for this
was jurisdictional. The lack of provincial jurisdiction north of the 60th parallel precluded
government inaction based on denial-of-jurisdiction arguments. As Chartrand notes, the
decision in Daniels that Métis are within federal jurisdiction now precludes those same
arguments south of the 60th parallel.68 Chartrand concludes that “there are Metis claims
south of 60° to lands and resources that are arguably no different in kind than those in the
north and should be equally acknowledged. Consequently, the existence of Metis specific
modern treaties in the north offers a solid precedent for the promotion of Metis treaties in
other parts of Canada.”69 Modern agreements in the north, while proposing to extinguish
Métis title, have in fact recognized its continued existence.
The willingness of the federal government to negotiate with Métis in the North on
issues of land rights and title that it claims to have already extinguished through scrip
grants generations ago, is evidence that the federal government may also be having
doubts about the efficacy of the extinguishment of Métis title.
2.2.3 Section 31 of the Manitoba Act
Section 31 of the Manitoba Act is set out above at section 2.1. In this provision,
the government of Canada recognizes the existence of Métis “Indian title” in Rupert’s
Land in 1870 for the purposes of extinguishment. In the House of Commons on May 2,
1870, Sir John A. Macdonald stated that these 1.4 million acres would constitute a
“reservation” for “the purpose of extinguishing the Indian title and all claims upon the
lands within the limits of the province.”70 Sir George-Etienne Cartier also argued in the
House that like treaties with the Indians, a large Métis land reserve was necessary “for the
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purpose of extinguishing the claims of half-breeds.”71 The Act’s passage would, it was
believed, facilitate the Métis’ “extinguishment of the Indian Title to the lands in the
Province,” through the appropriation of “ungranted lands, to the extent of one million
four hundred thousand acres thereof, for the benefit of the families of the halfbreed
residents.”72 The Act, as well as Macdonald’s and Cartier’s statements in Parliament,
seem to assume that there was a Métis share of “Indian title” to extinguish.
Section 31 should be analyzed within the framework of a potential surrender, and
not as a potential extinguishment by constitutional amendment. As discussed below,
section 31 is not a unilateral constitutional provision; rather, it reflects a bilateral
agreement between two parties reached after extensive negotiations, which resulted in
modifications to each side’s initial position.73 Analyzing s. 31 as a surrender—as opposed
to as a unilateral constitutional amendment—better reflects the agency of the parties,
which in turn is more likely to uphold the honour of the Crown74 and to promote
reconciliation.75 The holding in Manitoba Metis Federation that s. 31 is not a treaty76
does not preclude conceptualizing s. 31 within the surrender framework. In that decision,
a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Métis plaintiffs failed to
establish that the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to the Métis when implementing s. 31;
nonetheless, the majority held that s. 31 is a constitutional obligation which engages the
honour of the Crown and which the Crown failed to implement diligently.77 According to
the Court, this constitutional obligation is analogous to a treaty promise, has a treaty-like
history and character, establishes solemn promises “which are no less fundamental than
treaty promises”, and is the result of negotiations aimed at reconciling Métis Aboriginal
rights with the Crown’s claim to sovereignty.78 Given the treaty-like and bilateral nature
of s. 31, it is more appropriate to analyze it as a surrender than as a unilateral
constitutional amendment.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear
Island Foundation establishes a contentious yet not-overturned principle pertaining to
extinguishment by surrender.79 In this case, the Temagami First Nation argued that it had
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never signed the Robinson Huron Treaty, which purports to cover the traditional territory
of the Temagami First Nation, and hence the First Nation’s Aboriginal rights remained
unextinguished. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument and held that
regardless of whether any representative of the Temagami First Nation actually signed
the Robinson Huron Treaty in 1850, the Aboriginal rights of the Temagami First Nation
were surrendered when the First Nation subsequently received treaty payments and was
assigned a reserve.80 In other words, if an Aboriginal nation receives the benefits of a
surrender, it is held to the burden of the surrender. We contend that the inverse of this
proposition should also be true: if an Aboriginal nation does not receive the benefits of a
surrender, it should not be held to the burden of the surrender.81 Given the severe
consequences of the Bear Island principle—including the total loss of Aboriginal rights
potentially without any negotiation or legislative expression whatsoever—fairness and
the honour of the Crown requires the protection of Aboriginal rights by the inverse of the
Bear Island principle. We argue below that the Métis did not receive the benefits of s. 31,
and thus they should not be held to the burdens of s. 31. That is, s. 31did not effect an
extinguishment by surrender of Métis title.82
After years of delays, s. 31 lands were eventually distributed by the federal
government as individual grants ranging from 160 and 240 acres, a process which was
reproduced in the scrip commissions that followed. While at first glance scrip and s. 31
grants may appear to complete the exchange of Métis “Indian title” for individual land
grants, this process departed drastically from the manner in which the Métis originally
agreed to extinguish their “Indian title” in the Manitoba Act.83 As part of their agreement
to extinguish their title, the Métis leadership expected to be in control of the distribution
of these s. 31 lands through a committee of their own making that was authorized by the
Canadian executive for this purpose.84 This committee was also to exercise some level of
Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket” in Matt Bray & Ashley Thomson, eds,
Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990) 185.
80
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81
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continued jurisdiction over these s. 31 lands into the future, to protect them from sale to
non-Métis speculators and settlers. Therefore the implementation of a scrip system at the
hands of the federal government was a substantial unilateral change which undermined
the principal agreements represented in the Manitoba Act. If s. 31 of the Manitoba Act
was never properly implemented, then the success of s. 31’s extinguishment of the
“Indian title” of Métis at Red River is also questionable. Furthermore, since Métis
received little benefit from the distribution of these grants, they hardly reflect fair
compensation for the extinguishment of Métis title.
In order to fully appreciate the depth of the Manitoba Act, we must go beyond the
text of the document. While the text of s. 31 suggests that this land was to be chosen and
distributed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba, this language obscures the complex
negotiations and oral agreements that provide the basis for a more robust interpretation of
the meaning behind s. 31. In the winter of 1870, the Provisional Government of
Assiniboia dispatched three delegates to negotiate with the Canadian government a
satisfactory agreement that required, among other things, the protection of current
landholdings of Métis living at Red River.85 These negotiators had, over the course of
several weeks, met with Macdonald and Cartier agreeing upon what would later become
the Manitoba Act. Since the Manitoba Act was the result of a protracted and meticulous
negotiation process between representatives of the Métis-controlled Provisional
Government of Assiniboia and the Government of Canada in April and May 1870,
Canada’s faithfulness to the agreement is vital if Canada now claims that Métis title was
extinguished. If we are to respect the interpretation of Métis contemporaries, we can view
s. 31 as an agreement where Métis would extinguish their share of “Indian title” in the
new province, in exchange for a federally recognized reserve of Métis land, amongst
other Canadian political concessions.86 The sole surviving account of the negotiations is
from the appointed representative of the Métis at Red River, Abbé Noel-Joseph Ritchot.
In his journal, he recorded that the original agreement was that s. 31 lands would be
under the control of the new provincial legislature, “which could pass laws to ensure the
continuance of these lands in métis families.”87 When this was later altered to place the
s.31 lands under the federal legislature’s control, Ritchot wanted assurance that these
lands would be protected as if under provincial control. The agreed-to compromise was
that these lands would be overseen by a committee created “as soon as might be
[possible] after the Bill should be passed” via an executive order from the Privy
Council.88 Through this oversight committee, the Métis would be in control of the entire
reserve selection and distribution process—from selecting the reserve lands, to dividing
be respected and that any change in language was used purposefully to get the bill through
Parliament. Being told this by presumably honourable agents of the Crown, the representatives
likely assumed that the federal authorities would simply authorize the new provincial government
to enact their own land distribution policy, as this is essentially what Canadian leaders told them.
85
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and distributing them, to enacting laws through the local legislature to prevent outsiders
from acquiring these lands. Even though Ritchot complained that the language of the
Manitoba Bill did not contain reference to this oversight committee, both Macdonald and
Cartier reassured him that the verbal understandings of the Act would inform its
interpretation and implementation.89
That the Métis were willing to extinguish their share of Indian title is clearly
articulated in this agreement; what is less clear, however, is whether the distribution of
the 1.4 million acres can be said to have adequately extinguished the Métis share of the
title to what is now southern Manitoba. Instead of the implementation of this verbal
agreement, a scrip system was employed as a means to extinguish the title of individual
claimants. In Manitoba, the federal government did not begin the distribution of these
lands until 1876. Since the safety and social position of Métis had declined significantly
in the six years following the passage of the Manitoba Act, compounded with
administrative delays, Métis families often chose to leave Manitoba and the scrip system
offered quick cash in exchange for severely discounted land grants in the 1.4 million acre
Métis reserve.90 So transitory was the benefit to Métis families, scrip could not have
amounted to realistic compensation for the value of Métis title to southern Manitoba.91
Ultimately, rather than extinguishing Métis title through a negotiated agreement given
ascent by the Manitoba Act, Métis title was purportedly extinguished through policy that
differed significantly from the agreement that gave rise to s. 31.92
From this policy, Métis lands flowed quickly into the hands of speculators and
Canadian settlers. Fraudulent dealing also dispossessed Métis families of these land
grants intended for their children, but four times between 1881-1885 Manitoba’s
Legislative Assembly passed retroactive statutes to legalize all “irregular” sales of Métis
lands and to protect those, often powerful interests, who were implicated in this
dispossession.93 Due to these delays and irregularities, the Supreme Court held in
Manitoba Metis Federation that:
Section 31 of the Manitoba Act is a solemn constitutional
obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba, an Aboriginal people,
and it engaged the honour of the Crown. … Its broader purpose
was to reconcile the Métis’ Aboriginal interests in the Manitoba
territory with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over the area
that was to become the province of Manitoba. … Although the
honour of the Crown obliged the government to act with diligence
to fulfill s. 31, it acted with persistent inattention and failed to act
diligently to achieve the purposes of the s. 31 grant.
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If the original purpose of this agreement was to extinguish the Métis people’s share of
Indian title in southern Manitoba by an agreed-upon process, the Crown ultimately failed
to act honourably in its desire to extinguish Métis title. Deriving little benefit from this
unilateral shift in policy and with little realization of the dream of a substantial Métis
land-base in Manitoba, it is difficult to argue that the implementation of s. 31 of the
Manitoba Act resulted in the meaningful extinguishment of Métis title on the terms
originally agreed to by the Métis at Red River. The result is that, even among the most
vocal critics of the existence of Métis title, there is general consensus that “it does not
appear that the Métis derived much benefit from s. 31 of the Manitoba Act.”94 It is
therefore our position that Métis Aboriginal title was not surrendered via the Manitoba
Act, and that Métis title persists in what has become southern Manitoba.
2.2.4 Scrip Issued Pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act
The question whether scrip issued pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act
extinguished Métis title has been addressed exhaustively elsewhere.95 To this discussion
we will add only the following arguments: This question should be analyzed as a
potential extinguishment by surrender rather than as a potential extinguishment by
legislation. If the issuance of scrip constitutes the former and not the latter, then an
analysis of whether the legislation authorizing scrip exhibits the requisite clear and plain
intention is insufficient to answer the extinguishment question. It will be necessary to
apply the principles pertaining to extinguishment by surrender, including the principle—
supported by recent jurisprudence—that only the collective can make a surrender given
that Aboriginal rights are collective rights. Scrip could not extinguish Aboriginal rights,
including title, because scrip was issued on an individual, not a collective, basis.
Just as s. 31 and the events surrounding its implementation are better analyzed as
a potential surrender, so too is the scrip issued pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act. As
discussed above, with one possible exception, the government dealt with Métis interests
in land by issuing scrip, whereas it entered into what it claims are land surrender treaties
with First Nations.96 The issuance of scrip should be analyzed as a potential surrender
because from the perspective of the Canadian government, the purpose scrip was meant
94
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to serve was analogous to that of the so-called land surrender treaties.97 For example,
beginning in 1889 with the adhesion to Treaty 6, scrip commissioners accompanied treaty
commissioners and issued scrip to Métis individuals at the same time treaty
commissioners entered into treaties with First Nations.98 Similarly, the court in Morin &
Daigneault concluded that “the impression given to the Indian and Métis population was
that you had to make a choice and it made little difference whether you were Indian or
Métis and whether you took treaty or scrip.”99 Granted, the choice between scrip and
treaty had significant consequences in terms of colonial constructions of one’s identity
and the identity of one’s descendants.100 The court’s point here, though, is that Canadian
officials intended both scrip and treaties to serve the same purpose, namely, to extinguish
outstanding claims to land. Thus, just as treaties are categorized as potential surrenders,
scrip should be as well.
If the acceptance of scrip is a potential surrender, then assessing extinguishment
requires applying the principles pertaining to extinguishment by surrender, and not
merely the principles pertaining to extinguishment by legislation. A key principle
regarding extinguishment by surrender is that the surrender, to be effective, must be made
by the collective.
Joffe and Turpel have argued persuasively that scrip transactions could not have
extinguished the Aboriginal title of the Métis, as title is a collective right, but scrip was
issued to and accepted by individuals who did not have the capacity to extinguish
collective rights.101 Decisions released subsequent to the publication of Joffe and Turpel’s
report confirm the principles underlying their argument. The Supreme Court of Canada in
Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd. concluded that Aboriginal rights are collective in
nature and held by the “Aboriginal group”.102 Tsilhqot’in Nation confirmed that
Aboriginal title is a “collective title” held not only for the present members of the
Aboriginal community in question, but for all succeeding generations as well.103 The
Supreme Court of Canada in Powley confirmed that to extinguish Aboriginal rights, a
surrender must be made by the collective, and that this principle applies just as much to
the Métis as it does to First Nations.104 In R. v. Blais, the Supreme Court of Canada
contrasted the scrip process with the treaty process and noted that the Métis were dealt
with on an individual basis while treaties with First Nations were concluded on a
collective basis.105 Similarly, the court in Morin & Daigneault confirmed that Métis scrip
recipients were dealt with as individuals and not as a collective.106 Thus, if the Métis can
97
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establish Aboriginal title, any extinguishment argument based on the issuance of scrip
will not be compelling.
2.3. Extinguishment by Constitutional Amendment
Aside from s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, considered in section 2.2.3 above, three
other constitutional amendments or potential constitutional amendments are worth
addressing: the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTAs), the Charlottetown
Accord, and the Canada-Métis Nation Accord.
The three NRTAs (one for each of the prairie provinces) have constitutional status
by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1930.107 Each contains the following provision: “the
laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians
within the boundaries thereof”.108 In R. v. Horseman, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that this statement, combined with Alberta’s legislation regulating trafficking in wildlife,
extinguished the Treaty 8 right to hunt for commercial purposes in Alberta.109 This
conclusion does not impact the hunting or fishing rights of the Métis, as the Court held in
Blais that the Métis are not Indians for the purpose of this provision of the NRTAs.110
The Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion in Daniels that the Métis are Indians for the
purpose of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, does not alter the principle from
Blais.111 Thus, the NRTAs do not effect an extinguishment of Métis rights.112
Despite Canada’s assumption that Métis title was previously extinguished, it has
also acted in ways that suggest there is doubt about the efficacy of that extinguishment. In
1992, the Métis Nation and the Government of Canada agreed to the “Métis Nation
Accord” as a component of the Charlottetown Accord constitutional amendment package.
Both parties agreed to pursue comprehensive land claims and self-government
negotiations, which meant the relevant provinces (with the exception of Alberta) would
“make available their fair share of Crown lands for transfer to Métis self-governing
institutions.”113 These lands and their subsequent governance would be organized as a
“land negotiation process” between Canada, the provinces, and representatives of the
Métis Nation.114 The parties also “agreed to constitutionally entrench a commitment to
negotiate land with the Métis.” In Canada, these kinds of comprehensive land claims
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processes have almost exclusively concerned lands and Indigenous peoples where title is
unextinguished or extinguishment was questionable. Presumably, such negotiations
would have been unnecessary if the Crown was confident it had legitimately extinguished
Métis title across the West. More recently, on April 13, 2017, the Métis National Council
and the five provincial Métis organizations signed an agreement in principle with the
Government of Canada to “advance reconciliation of the rights, claims, interests and
aspirations of the Métis Nation and those of all Canadians.”115 While the agreement does
not mention “land claims” in particular, it is nonetheless cognizant that “outstanding
claims against the Crown” may still exist and establishes a new “Permanent Bilateral
Mechanism” to address such claims.116 This accord would also likely be unnecessary if
the federal government had extinguished Métis title to the satisfaction of its own
institutions and citizens.
The federal government’s conduct with the Métis Nation Accord shows that there
are cracks in the confidence in Métis extinguishment. While there remains resistance to
acknowledge that Métis title persists, there is also a growing realization that Métis lands
and rights are live issues that must be dealt with in more substantive ways than
previously. Métis title and its unsuccessful extinguishment require a level of attention and
dialogue previously missing, and if the Métis Nation Accord and more recent
negotiations are any indication, the future lies not in denying Métis title, but in
negotiating the terms for its recognition.
3. Conclusion
With the failure of Canada to extinguish Métis title through surrender, legislation,
or constitutional amendment, it is therefore logical and just to assume that Métis title to
the Métis homelands persists. While Manitoba Métis in 1870 may have been willing to
surrender their share of title to their homelands, they were willing to do so only under
certain circumstances and with a guarantee that these rights would be fairly compensated
with a large land reserve. It is unjust to assume that if the Crown did not fulfill its end of
the bargain, Métis should be held to theirs. If Métis title was not successfully
extinguished through any of these means, the Crown possesses substantial and ongoing
obligations to the Métis people. Both the honour of the Crown and the principle of
reconciliation require that these obligations be addressed. Indeed, this would have
profound implications for the current state of Métis-Canada relations. It would require a
substantial redress and recognition of Métis lands (alongside the lands of other
Indigenous peoples) and it would necessitate good faith negotiations between the two
parties to rectify the current situation. The recognition that Métis title is unextinguished,
far from ushering in an era of uncertainty and contention, could also be the opportunity to
rectify historical and contemporary injustices, providing the moral imperative to build
better relations with one another. This outcome, however, is dependent upon good faith
actions from Canadian political and juridical leaders, grounded in a deep analysis of
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historical events, which contradict the colonial imagination that has for so long shaped
Métis-Canada relations.
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